ABSTRACT Modern IC designs often involve outsourced IP cores. It is convinced that there are opportunities in which the IP cores contain malicious logic, namely hardware Trojan (HT), which raises serious concerns about the trustworthiness of ICs used in mission-critical applications. This paper proposes an HT detection method by analyzing the combined structural features of HTs and host circuits. The structural features of combinational and sequential logic HTs are extracted and form an HT feature database. An efficient quantization approach on feature matching is proposed to search the features from circuit designs. The experiments conducted on TrustHub benchmarks show that the proposed method can successfully detect all stealth Trojans with runtime within 72 s on a platform with an AMD 2.00-GHz CPU with 4-GB RAM and a low false positive rate compared with the existing methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern IC designs often involve third-party intellectual property (IP) cores because of the high design complexity, the restriction of time-to-market and the cost constraint of final products [1] . One of the challenges faced by the IP reuse-based design methodology is the untrustworthiness of the outsourced IPs. It is convinced that there are opportunities in which the IP cores contain malicious extra logic, namely Hardware Trojan (HT). HTs can cause the circuit failure or leak confidential information, which raise serious concerns about trustworthiness of ICs used in Internet of Things (IoT) [2] and consumer electronics (CE) [3] , as well as mission critical applications [4] .
In addition to the design stage, HTs can also be inserted during and after IC fabrication. Usually a HT is quietly hidden in its host circuit and can only be triggered in rare conditions [5] . To detect the silent HTs, currently there are three categories of method: logic testing [6] - [10] , side-channel analysis [11] - [16] and feature analysis [17] - [22] . Logic testing approaches [6] - [10] attempt to generate a large number of test vectors to activate unknown HTs and propagate their effects to the output ports. The test vector generation and
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application usually require significant amount of time and do not guarantee a hundred percent coverage. The logic testing approaches can be applied to detect HTs at both pre-and post-fabrication stages. The side-channel analysis approaches detect HTs by finding circuit delay, power consumption and electromagnetic radiation differences caused by HTs, even not activated. The effectiveness of side-channel analysis approaches is greatly affected by process variations and usually depends on a golden reference design. The side-channel analysis approaches detect HTs at the post-fabrication stage. In contrast, feature analysis approaches [17] - [22] , in which structural features in gate-level netlist of known HTs are extracted for identification, have been proven as an effective static approach and avoid test vector generation and application. Like software virus detection paradigm, HT feature database is constructed and maintained. When a new type of HT appears, the HT feature database is extended. The feature analysis approaches target at HT detection at the prefabrication stage. In fact, these three types of HT detection method can provide complementary capabilities in detecting Trojans inserted in different IC production chain stages.
Our previous work [21] based on the structural features in gate-level netlist successfully detected single-triggered HTs from TrustHub benchmarks [23] with low false positive rate. An HT is considered to be successfully detected if part of the HT gates is in the HT candidates [10] . In this paper, we extend the method [21] in the following ways: (a) the structural features of combinational logic HTs in addition to single-triggered HTs are extracted, (b) the structural features of sequential logic HTs are extracted, (c) structural features of the HT circuits and the host circuits are combined, and (d) time complexity of the feature matching algorithm is reduced by exploiting the topological sorting technique. Combining the four extensions, the HT detection coverage and efficiency are significantly improved.
The contributions of this paper are:
• To the best of our knowledge, the structural features in gate-level netlist of the HT circuits and the host circuits are examined and combined for the first time in HT detection. The idea is based on the fact that the elusiveness of HTs relies on not just HT structure design but also the insertion positions in the host circuits, in which HTs are usually inserted at either the low controllability position or the low observability position owning the stealth characteristic [19] .
• The structural features of combinational logic HTs and sequential logic HTs in TrustHub benchmarks [23] are extracted. The new features make a good supplement to the existing HT feature database.
• An efficient quantization approach on feature matching is proposed based on the topological sorting technique in graph theory.
• The experiments conducted on TrustHub benchmarks show that our approach can successfully detect all stealth Trojans with short runtime and low false positive rate. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly introduces the related work. The threat model and the overall flow of the proposed method are presented in Section III. In Sections IV-VII, the HT detection method proposed in the paper is described in detail. The experimental results are shown and analyzed in section VIII. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
HT is a piece of circuit that is added to the design or is modified from the original design for malicious purposes. In terms of activation characteristics, HTs could be always on or condition based. To be hidden in chips, the HTs usually are designed to be silent in most of time. A typical HT contains trigger and payload [4] . The payload circuit is responsible for implementing HT attacks, which may result in serious effects such as denial of service, confidential information leakage and chip reliability degradation. The trigger monitors a certain condition, which could be a specific logic state, a particular input pattern or a specific counter value.
Recently, a number of hardware Trojan detection methods based on circuit feature analysis have been proposed. In [17] , the authors propose a HT detection method named FASTrust. They construct the flip-flop level control data flow graphs (CDFGs) in which flip-flops, primitive inputs, as well as primitive outputs are abstracted as nodes and combinational logic circuits are abstracted as directed edges. In a CDFG, all vertices are classified into two categories: loop vertices each containing a self-loop and normal vertices without selfloops. Loop vertices connected together can form a loop group. Four features are extracted from CDFGs to identify different types of HT: Feature 1 is that a time-triggered HT has a large loop group; Feature 2 is that a combinational logictriggered HT contains a node with large in-degree; Feature 3 indicates that an sequential logic-triggered HT contains a loop group with large in-degree; Feature 4 extracts that all nodes in a DeTrust HT have small out-degrees. A threshold was set for each feature. If there are circuits whose feature values are larger than the thresholds, these circuits will be reported as suspicious circuits. Chen et. al. [22] further extended FASTrust to multilevel FASTrsut (ML-FASTrust). For each reported HT suspicious node, combinational logic circuit was constructed between the suspicious node and the nearest level of flip-flops in its fan-in cone. Then, the toggling rate at the combinational logic was obtained. If the toggle rate is smaller than a threshold, it is considered that the circuit contains HTs.
The controllability and observability analysis has been proven to be an effective technique for HT detection [19] . The controllability and observability well characterize the host circuit. HTs inserted at either the low controllability position or the low observability position own the stealth characteristic. The method proposed in [19] took a gate-level netlist as the input, and performed the controllability and observability analysis. Afterwards, the k-means clustering was performed to cluster gates based on their controllability and observability values, and gates having significant intercluster distance from the genuine gates are Trojan candidates. Xie et. al. [20] further developed the method [19] . In [20] , the inter-cluster distance was calculated and combined with the number of primitives, AND gates, and OR gates in the circuit as a four-dimensional vector to input to a SVM (Support Vector Machine) classifier for HT detection. Here, the primitives include all the information of inputs/outputs, DFFs, BUFs, MUXs and other gates.
A variety of machine learning algorithms has been used in HT detection more recently, including the SVM [24] , random forest classifier [25] and multilayer neural networks [26] . In [26] , the number of logic gate fanins, DFFs, MUXs, loops, logic levels to primitive input/output ports were extracted as Trojan-net features. These features were used as inputs of a neural network. There were two units in the output layer of the neural network. One unit corresponds to the normal nets, and the other corresponds to the Trojan nets. When the output value of the first unit is larger than that of the second one, the net is considered as a normal net; otherwise, a Trojan net is found.
The above methods examined the structural features of HTs and host circuits separately. However, the stealth of HTs is determined by both features. Therefore, we combine them together so as to improve the efficiency of HT detection. 
III. FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSED METHOD
This section describes the threat model considered in this paper and gives an overview of the proposed HT detection method.
A. THREAT MODEL
The threat model considered in this paper is that the condition-based digital HTs, which are not easily detected by normal verification/testing approaches, are inserted into the IP cores by untrusted members or untrusted electronics design automation tools in outsourced vendors. Attackers by inserting HTs could steal privacy or make critical damages to the electronic systems under certain conditions. There are also always-on HTs which are not in the range of our study.
According to trigger mechanisms, HTs can be classified into combinational logic HTs and sequential logic HTs. Combinational logic HTs can be further classified into single pattern (SP) Trojans and case patterns (CP) Trojans. SP Trojans are activated when the monitored signals meet a unique specific pattern. CP Trojans are activated when the monitored signals meet any of the specific patterns.
The trigger circuits of the sequential logic HTs contain sequential elements such as flip-flops. Sequential logic HTs can be further classified into counter Trojans and state machine (SM) Trojans. For counter Trojans, the trigger condition is based on a single value (SV), or a range of values (RV) of an internal counter. SM Trojans are activated when a certain specific sequence of patterns is met at the monitored signals, which stimulate a sequence of state transitions. In order to improve the stealth, SM Trojans usually have a large state machine. The size of a state machine is reflected in both 'depth' and 'width'. The 'width' of a Trojan state machine is represented by the input width of the state machine; the 'depth' of a Trojan state machine is represented by the number of states. SM Trojans increase the stealth in the following two ways:
• Increasing the input width of the state machine. With wider bit-width inputs, the conditions for state transitions are more difficult to be satisfied. This kind of SM Trojans is defined as Wide State Machine (WSM) Trojans.
• Increasing the depth of the state machine. In the current state, if the input does not meet the condition of transition to the next state, it returns to the IDLE state. This is equivalent to indirectly increasing the number of states. This kind of SM Trojans is defined as Deep State Machine (DSM) Trojans. The proposed method aims to detect the combinational logic and sequential logic HTs mentioned above. An overview of the method is shown next.
B. FRAMEWORK
The framework of our proposed method is shown in Fig.1 . In the proposed method, a database that contains HT structural feature templates is established. The structural templates in the database are the basic elements. An HT can contain multiple and various basic elements cascaded deeply and widely. First, the third-party IP core under test is synthesized to a gate-level netlist. Then, the netlist goes through HT feature analysis and host circuit feature analysis. In the HT feature analysis process, the netlist is searched to find circuit elements which match to the structural feature templates in the database. Once a template is matched, an integer score is given to the circuit element. The score indicates how inactive the circuit element is and is called Trojan rare value. In the host circuit feature analysis process, the controllability and observability (called host rare value) of each circuit element including logical gates and flip-flops are examined. Afterwards, the Trojan rare value and the host rare value are combined to be a comprehensive rare value defined as THRV (Trojan-Host Rare Value) for each circuit element. Finally, the circuit elements are sorted in a descending order of THRV values and HT candidates are found by looking for THRV outliers.
Different parts of the framework will be presented in the following sections, including feature extraction, HT feature analysis, host circuit feature analysis, THRV rare value combination and outlier determination.
IV. STRUCTURE FEATURE EXTRACTION OF HTS
Feature-based HT detection methods mainly extract Trojan features from known Trojan benchmarks [22] . Based on the above HT classification and HT circuits from [23] , we extract two sets of structural features, one set for SP, CP, SV, RV and WSM Trojans and another set for DSM Trojans, respectively.
1) COMBINATIONAL STRUCTURE FEATURES
We analyze the gate-level netlists of several typical combinational HT circuits. The trigger circuits indeed bare some common features. We abstract the features as a number of structure templates, which serve as basic elements. The established templates are shown in Table 1 . Each template contains two levels of logic gates with m and n inputs respectively, each from the four types of AONN (AND, OR, NAND, NOR) gates. Note that, m and n are integers which are 2 or more (m, n = 2, 3, 4, 5. . . ). There may be cases, although not found in existing HTs, in which inverters or buffers exist between the two levels of AONN gates. The feature extraction algorithm can extract equivalent logic. For example, buffers and the even number of inverters are ignored, and the odd number of inverters is equivalent to logically inverting the gate in the first level. According to the principle of permutation, there should be 16 combinations of the AONN gates. However, the 8 templates we summarized are particular gate combinations that result in '1' or '0' infrequently, while the other 8 combinations do not and hence are not included in our templates. Given a concrete number of m and n to a template from Table 1 , a case is instantiated. Note that, the output of the first level could be connected to any input of the second level. Fig.2 illustrates a circuit consisting of cases of Templates 5, 6 and 1. The number of input combinations of this circuit is 1024 (2 10 ). Given the probability of each input being '0' and '1' is 1/2, the probability of the output being '0' is 1/1024. If being '0', which is a low probability event for the circuit, is the trigger of a HT, then the HT is only activated when the input pattern is '1111000011'. The HT is an SP Trojan.
The trigger circuits of HTs could contain multiple similar structures cascaded. This is consistent with the stealth property of HTs. Therefore, the HTs could be detected by looking for the structures. In Section V we will show that the structures are identified by calculating rare values of the logic gates.
For SV, RV and WSM sequential Trojans, they all use comparators to determine if the trigger condition is satisfied. If k-bit outputs of the counter or state machine are regarded as k signals of the host circuit, the trigger structure features of SV, RV and WSM Trojans also match the structure templates shown in Table 1 . An example of comparators used in SV, RV and WSM trojans and in normal circuits is shown in Fig. 3 . We can see that in Fig. 3 (a) there are NAND4-NOR2 and NOR2-NAND2 cases, while in Fig. 3 (b) there is not structure matched to the eight templates. Therefore, the SP, CP, SV, RV and WSM Trojans share the same combinational logic structure features. 
2) SEQUENTIAL STRUCTURE FEATURES
The DSM Trojans indirectly increase the depth of the state machine without increasing the number of states. This leads to the increase of the number of interconnections between state registers and between state registers and state machine input signals. Fig. 4 shows the circuit structure of an FSM (Finite State Machine) with 1-bit input and 5 states, and the structure of a DSM derived from the FSM by adding transitions from each state to the IDLE state. The figure illustrates the input signal paths of each state register R0, R1 and R2 from state registers R0 − R2 (represented by circles) and state machine input (represented by input ports), respectively. The figure points out the structural feature of the state registers that each state register has a circle path from itself and the cross feedback paths from the other state registers. The obvious structure difference of FSM and DSM is that the number of paths from R0 − R2 and the state machine input to each state register increases in DSM. The number increases from 14 to 20 in total for three state registers. If the number of state machine inputs increases, the difference becomes larger as shown in Table 2 . Therefore, the total number of paths from state registers and state machine inputs to each state register is extracted as the structural feature of DSM Trojans. In [22] the feature is the total in-degree of the group of state registers, while the feature in our work considers both in-degree of group of state registers and interconnections among the state registers in the group. By considering the interconnections within the group, the difference between FSM and DSM is amplified. For example, in Table 2 , when only in-degree is considered, the FSM and DSM cannot be identified for 2 state machine inputs. Though the number of paths depends on the gate-level implementation, the number of paths of a DSM is always larger than that of the FSM, from which the DSM is derived, in a circuit under a given gate-level implementation.
The structural features of combinational and sequential logic Trojans described above form a database for HT detection.
V. STRUCTURAL FEATURE MATCHING ALGORITHMS
The proposed method identifies suspicious circuits from a circuit design by looking for small piece of circuits which has the structural features shown in the previous section. We propose feature matching algorithms for the combinational and sequential logic structural feature analysis, respectively. The matching degree is quantified as integer values, Trojan rare values. Higher the matching degree is, larger the rare value is.
A. COMBINATIONAL LOGIC STRUCTURAL FEATURE MATCHING
The procedure for calculating the combinational rare values of the AONN gates is the following [21] . In the first step, all AONN gates are extracted from a given gate-level netlist to form a set N 1 . The AONN gates extraction significantly reduces the complexity of the HT detection, because the number of circuit elements which need to be analyzed is significantly reduced.
In the second step, for each gate G j in N 1 , its rare value crv j is initialized to its input number. In the third step, each input pin I i of G j is evaluated according to the following three criteria:
1) There is a gate G i connected to I i in N 1 .
2) Two adjacent gates G i − G j match one of the cases of the AONN templates. 3) G i 's fan-out is one. If all three criteria are satisfied, the rare value crv i of G i is accumulated into the rare value crv j of G j . Afterwards, G j is added to set N 2 . If all input pins of G j do not satisfy the criteria, G j is put into set N 3 .
In the last step, if set N 2 is empty, then all gates obtain their final values and the algorithm terminates; otherwise go back to the third step and the process iterates. Let us continue with the example in Fig.2 . Following the above procedure, the initial rare values of NAND4, OR2, NOR4 and NAND3 are 4, 2, 4 and 3, respectively. Because NAND4-NOR4, OR2-NOR4 and NOR4-NAND3 match the Templates 5, 6 and 1, the accumulated rare values of the four gates in the end are 4, 2, 8 and 10, respectively. As we can see, the logic gates? transition probability decreases and the rare value increases with the cascaded structure.
The time complexity of the above procedure is approximately O(V·E), where V and E are the number of gates and the number of interconnections in a netlist, respectively. To reduce the time complexity, we consider the topologi-cal sorting algorithm which has linear complexity O(V+E). Topological sorting [28] is a technique in graph theory. It sorts all the nodes in a directed acyclic graph in a certain order. The procedure for calculating the combinational rare values can be realized by the modified sorting method for reduced complexity. The gate-level netlist is essentially a directed graph in which nodes represent basic circuit elements and edges represent the signal propagation paths. The netlist may contain cyclic paths, especially in state registers of FSMs. It is not a problem for netlist with only AONN gates because sequential paths with feedback are removed. It will be shown in the result section that the modified algorithm has superior performance compared to the original method in [21] . Following the similar procedure, we also develop the feature matching algorithm for the sequential structure features in the next subsection.
Algorithm 1

B. SEQUENTIAL LOGIC STRUCTURAL FEATURE MATCHING
To match the feature of DSM HTs, we need to calculate the total number of paths (defined as sequential rare value) from state registers and state machine inputs to each state register. To amplify the feature, we calculate the total value of a group of state registers which belong to an FSM. The procedure for calculating sequential rare value is shown in algorithm 2. So far, we have presented the logic structural features of stealth HTs and the feature matching methods. The elusiveness of HTs is determined not only by the HT structures, but also by the HT insertion positions in the host circuits. Therefore, the structural features of the HTs and the host circuits are combined in a way shown in the next section.
VI. COMBINATION OF STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF HTS AND HOST CIRCUITS
The insertion positions of HTs are usually chosen to be the circuit nodes which are difficult to control and observe from the primary ports. The controllability and observability analysis of a circuit has been used for HT detection in [19] . We adopt the approach for analysis of the HT insertion positions, and combine it with the HT structural features. The SCOAP method [30] is used to measure the controllability and observability of nodes at the circuit level. We examine AONN gates and registers, and define a combined rare value THRV for each element as shown in Fig.5 . THRV consists of two parts. The first part TRV is the Trojan rare value that reflects the rarity of the Trojan structures. The second part SCOAP value is the host rare value that reflects the rarity of insertion positions in the host circuit. The definition of the second part is determined by the type of circuit elements [19] . For example, for an AND gate, 1 is a rare output compared to 0. Therefore, CC 1 (1-controllability) of inputs represents its controllability. Its observability is reflected by the CO (observability) of the output. The weight coefficient w is dynamically adjusted to keep the SCOAP value in the same order of magnitude as Trojan rare value. As will be seen in the result section, using THRV in HT detection leads to higher detection accuracy than using TRV .
VII. OUTLIER DETERMINATION
The feature matching algorithms have been applied to a set of HT benchmarks. From the rare value THRV distributions we made three observations. First, there are always a few outliers in the rare value distribution of each benchmark. Second, the outliers tend to have the highest rare values. Third, the gates or register groups corresponding to the rare value outliers are part of HTs. Therefore, the problem of HT detection is transformed to rare value outlier determination. Based on the three points, we propose an algorithm to identify outliers as shown in Algorithm 3. For a given THRV list, the elements are first sorted by value in a descending order. During the sorting, the number of elements which have the same rare value THRV i is also counted as m i .
Algorithm 3 Outlier Determination
Input 
There are three criteria to determine an outlier s i as shown in line 4 of Algorithm 3.
1) The difference between s i and s i+1 is greater than the average of the rare values of elements s i+1 , . . . , s n . This criterion means that there should be an obvious gap between s i and the subsequent elements in terms of the rare values.
2) The number of elements which have the same large value THRV i should be small. This criterion corresponds to the first observation that the number of outliers is small, and to the fact that the number of elements constituting HTs is small. 3) An outlier s i should be at the top of a descending list and thus its index i is small. This criterion corresponds to the second observation that the outliers tend to have highest rare value. The three parameters T 1 , T 2 and T 3 in Algorithm 3 are decided by the rare value list and data fitting in practice. Through the three parameters T 1 , T 2 and T 3 we could achieve some guarantees on the detectability of the targeted HTs. Following the theoretical analysis approach [22] on the detectability, a HT with q-bit trigger inputs should select q log 2 l, where l is the number of clock cycles for which the functional verification process tests a circuit, in order to escape from the verification process. If the threshold of HT features is larger than log 2 l, then all HTs having the features can be detected. The same conclusion is achievable in our method. In Algorithm 3, a conservative selection of T 1 , T 2 and T 3 can ensure a threshold larger than log 2 l, leading to negligible false negative rate. Section VIII will show the determination method of the parameters on the tested HT benchmarks and their impacts on HT detection efficiency.
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To evaluate the proposed approach, HT benchmarks from TrustHub are used. The benchmarks include two sets of circuits, one in the register transfer level description and another in the gate-level description. Synopsys Design Complier under saed90nm technology library is used for synthesizing the benchmarks described in the register transfer level. Synopsys TetraMAX is used to obtain CC 0 , CC 1 , and CO. Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 are implemented in Python. Experimental platform is an AMD A8-6410 2.00GHz CPU with 4GB RAM.
The three parameters in the outlier determination algorithm are determined as below. T 2 is determined according to the size n of the rare value list S. For HTs we have seen, the maximum number of elements with the same rare value is 32. Therefore, we set T 2 to 0.1 x (x = 0, 1, 2. . . ) so that T 2 × n is less than 32. T 1 and T 3 are decided by data fitting. Because the rare values of sequential logic structure features are generally larger than the rare values of AONN structure features, T 1 and T 3 are determined separately. We pick 10 rare value distributions from SP, CP, SV, RV and WSM HTs, and 8 rare value distributions from DSM HTs. Rare value outliers are known for these distributions. 
A. DETECTION RESULTS
The detection results of combinational logic Trojans are shown in Table 3 . Columns 'C' and 'H' show the number of suspicious HT gates (Candidates) and the number of real HT gates (Hits, indicating true positives) from the candidate list. The circuit scale means the number of elements including AND, NAND, OR, NOR, INV, BUF, MUX, DFF. The HT scale means the number of HT gates or DFF groups. As shown in Table 3 , 33 of 34 HTs are detected. The HT in s38584_t100 that is not detected has been proven to be easily activated [19] , so the Trojan rare value and SCOAP rare value are both small. It could be detected by normal functional verification and testing techniques.
The detection results of SV, RV and WSM Trojans are shown in Table 4 . HTs are detected from all circuits except from the pic series. In pic series circuits, the HT trigger, a 13-bit counter, observes the number of executions of a specific instruction. When the number is above 100 the Trojan is triggered. The counter is incremented by one if a 4-bit signal satisfies some specific values. When this 4-bit signal is equal to 1101, the counter is reset to zero. Regarding the trigger condition, the HT activation probability is 1−100/2 13 . As a result, its combinational rare value is small. However, the reset operation actually makes the HT not easy to be activated, which is equivalent to indirectly increasing the counter value. This feature is the same as DSM HTs. Fig. 6 illustrates the structure of the counter like in the pic series circuits, where the registers have cross feedback paths.
The detection results of pic series and the DSM Trojans are shown in Table 5 . As can be seen, all pic series and the DSM Trojans are detected.
Except for one easily activated HT, all rarely activated HTs from TrustHub benchmarks are detected efficiently by our approach. Accuracy rate (R acc ) is defined as the percentage of true positives of candidates [9] , [17] . As shown VOLUME 7, 2019 in Table 3 , 4 and 5, among 64 detected HT circuits, the average of accuracy rate is 78%. That is, 78 out of 100 suspicious circuit elements, determined by our approach, belong to HTs. The accuracy rate is 100% for 42 detected HT circuits.
In addition, we also explore the impacts of the parameters Table 6 . In Table 6 , the check mark indicates that HT is detected from a circuit. The results show that when T 1 = 0.2 and T 3 = 0.1, HTs are successfully detected from all HT-infected circuits, as well as from 8 HT-free circuits. As T 1 gets bigger and T 3 smaller, the number of detected HT-infected circuits slightly decreases and more HT-free circuits are detected as HT free. When T 1 = 1.6 and T 3 = 0.02, HTs are detected from 45 of 56 HT-infected circuits and 2 of 10 HT-free circuits. Therefore, the selection of the parameters T 1 and T 3 allows tradeoff between false negative rate and false positive rate. In practice, one may want to keep low false negative rate at the loss of false positive rate. The false positive cases may be identified by further processes.
B. RUN TIME ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED METHOD
As shown in Table 7 , the run time of the method proposed in this paper is divided into three parts: the time consumed by Trojan rare value calculation (t 1 ), i.e. the time consumed by Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2, the time consumed by host rare value calculation (t 2 ), and the time consumed by outlier determination (t 3 ), i.e. the time consumed by Algorithm 3. As we can see, for the largest AES series circuits which have 176.9K elements, the average runtime is 71.353 seconds, and for the smallest rs232 series which have 0.252K elements, the average runtime is 0.252 seconds. The time for host rare value calculation dominates the runtime as the circuit size increases. The runtime comparison with exiting methods is shown in Fig. 7 . The average detection time of our method is 2.56 seconds longer than that in [22] , because the method [22] is based on the information flow graph which has less circuit information than the netlist. However, our approach has lower false positive rate than [22] which will be seen next. Compared with [21] whose runtime only contains t 1 and t 3 , our method is 75.4 times faster due to the use of topological sorting.
C. COMPARISON WITH EXISTING METHODS
Finally, We compare the false positive rate (R fp ) and accuracy rate (R acc ) of our method with three existing methods proposed in [21] , [22] , [26] . R fp is defined as the percentage of false positives of total logic elements [9] . The values R fp and R acc of the three methods are computed using the reported data from the published papers. The comparison is shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 . It can be seen from the figures that our method successfully detect HTs with lower false positive rate and higher accuracy rate. Several values of R fp and R acc are blanked for the three methods, because the detection results were not reported in their papers. Table 8 summaries HT detection results of the methods [21] , [22] , [26] and our proposed method. In [21] , [22] , [26] , only a subset of benchmarks is tested, while our method is applied to all benchmarks and can successfully detect all HTs. Columns 5, 6, 12 and 13 show the detection [21] , [22] , [26] .
results while only using Trojan rare values and only using host rare values. The trigger inputs of some HTs are the primitive inputs and the payloads are the primitive outputs, so the SCOAP rare values of the host circuit are small. These HTs cannot be detected by only host rare values. On the other hand, there are HTs whose trigger circuit is simple resulting in small Trojan rare values. As a result, these HTs cannot be detected by only Trojan rare values. All above HTs are detected by using Trojan host rare values because they contain the information of both Trojan rare values and host rare values.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a HT detection method based on structural features of Trojans and host circuits. We extract a number of structural features of HTs from gate-level netlists and construct a HT database covering the combinational logic HT features and sequential logic HT features. Efficient feature analysis algorithms are developed to search small piece of circuits which match the features in the database and are assigned with a score. A score outlier determination algorithm is developed to identify suspicious Trojan elements. The experimental results show that the proposed method is capable of detecting all stealth Trojans from the benchmarks with short runtime and low false positive rate, compared to the existing HT detection methods. 
